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Article 3

COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DUE PROCESS OF LAW
RE-EVALUATED
By C. RicirARD

BARTALINI

On July 5, 1955 the California Supreme Court in Steinmetz v. California State Board of Education' held that pursuant to section 1028.1 of
the Government Code of California, a public employee could be dismissed
from his employment for failing to answer certain questions put to him by
the governing body of the state or local agency by which he was employed.
Specifically, section 1028.1 of the California Government Code, which is
part of a statute commonly known as the Luckel Act, provides that it shall
be the duty of any public employee, when ordered to do so, to appear before
the governing body which has employed him and answer, under oath, questions relating to:
(a) Present personal advocacy by the employee of the forceful or violent overthrow of the Government of the United States or of any state.
(b) Past knowing membership at any time since September 10, 1948, in
any organization which, to the knowledge of such employee, during the
time of the employee's membership, advocated the forceful or violent overthrow of the Government of the United States or of any state.
(c) Present knowing membership in any organization now advocating
the forceful or violent overthrow of the Government of the United States
or of any state.
(d) Questions as to present knowing membership of such employee in
the Communist Party or as to past knowing membership in the Communist Party at any time since September 10, 1948.2
The section further provides that:
Any employee who fails or refuses to appear or to answer under oath on
any ground whatsoever, any such questions so propounded shall be guilty
of insubordination and guilty of violating this section and shall be suspended and dismissed from his employment in the manner provided by law.3
In the Steinmetz case, petitioner, Dr. Steinmetz was dismissed from his
position as an associate professor at San Diego State College because of his
refusal, at a hearing before the State Board of Education, to answer two
questions as to whether he was or had been a member of the Communist
Party. His petition for writ of mandate to compel his reinstatement was
denied by the Supreme Court of California.
The Supreme Court of the United States denied writ of certiorari to
Dr. Steinmetz.
144 Cal.2d 816, 285 P.2d 617 (1955).
2 CALIf. GovT. CODE § 1028.1.

3 Ibid.
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Under a New York City municipal charter provision requiring the discharge, without notice or hearing, of a municipal employee utilizing the
privilege against self-incrimination in refusing to answer legally authorized
inquiries as to his official conduct, a New York City employee, a city college
professor, was summarily discharged for his claim of the privilege in refusing, when appearing before a congressional committee investigating matters
of national security, to answer questions regarding past Communist Party
membership.
Five members of the United States Supreme Court, in Slochower v.
Board of Education of New York, ' held that the dismissal of Professor
Slochower was improper and that the municipal charter provision as applied to the employee was a denial of due process of law.
The denial of the writ of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court
in the Steinmetz case leaves to speculation the validity of the California
statute in view of the court's decision in the Slochower case, a case presenting almost the same fact situation.
The question presents itself as to the reconcilability of the two cases.
Were the fact situations so different as to make the action of the governing
body of one state a denial of due process of law and the other not such a
denial? Or is the California statute, in the light of the Slochower case, unconstitutional?
Before these questions can be answered, the basis for the two decisions
must be examined to determine whether or not they are in conflict.
In the Steinmetz case, the California Supreme Court declared that
Steinmetz had refused to answer two questions asked under subdivision (d)
of section 1028.1 of the California Government Code, namely:
"(1) Are you knowingly a member of the Communist Party?", and
"(2) Have you at any time since September 10, 1948 knowingly been a
member of the Communist Party?" 5 His discharge was based on this refusal.
The court further declared that in considering section 1028.1 as a
whole, it shows on its face that the Legislature, in using the words "knowing membership" was referring to a person's knowledge of his membership
rather than to his knowledge of the character of the organization.
The court upheld the validity of section 1028.1 by declaring that statutes such as the one involved here, which merely compel disclosure of information concerning a public employee's membership in proscribed organizations, must be distinguished from those which provide discharge or disqualification because of membership or refusal to take an oath denying
membership. Under the latter type of statute, the United States Supreme
Court has held that a knowledge of the character of the organization is
essential,6 and the legislation has been sustained only when it expressly or
4 350 U.S. 551 (1956).

544 Cal.2d at 821, 285 P.2d at 620.
6 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
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impliedly required such knowledge.' On the other hand, where the statutes
provide merely for the disclosure of information, a requirement that the employee have knowledge of the nature of the organization is not necessary.'
The California Supreme Court also pointed out that Steinmetz's refusal
to answer was not based upon a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution or section
13 of Article I of the State Constitution, and that therefore he was precluded from relying on these constitutional provisions on appeal. The court
observed further that:
"A person may properly be required to disclose information relevant to
fitness and loyalty as a reasonable condition for obtaining or retaining
public employment, even though the disclosure, under some circumstances,
may amount to self-incrimination." 9
As authority, the court cited Garnerv. Board of Public Works" and Adler
v. Board of Education.' This seems to infer that even if Steinmetz had
availed himself of the privilege, the court would have sustained his discharge.
Thus, it seems that the California Supreme Court upheld Steinmetz's
dismissal on the grounds that he failed to answer certain designated questions and accordingly must be dismissed pursuant to section 1028.1 of the
Government Code, that the Legislature had the authority in the public
interest to pass such legislation, and that the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination was not relevant inasmuch as it was not claimed by Dr.
Steinmetz.
In comparison, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the Slociower
case, held that the summary dismissal of Slochower violated due process of
law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.
Section 903 of the Charter of the City of NewYork provides that whenever an employee of the city utilizes the privilege against self-incrimination
to avoid answering a question relating to his official conduct, his term or
tenure of office or employment shall terminate and such office or employment shall be vacant, and he shall not be eligible to election or appointment
to any office or employment under the city or any agency.
Slochower invoked the privilege against self-incrimination under the
Fifth Amendment before an investigating committee of the United States
Senate, and was summarily discharged from his position as associate professor at Brooklyn College, an institution maintained by the City of New
York.
7
Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 494 (1952) ; Garner v. Board of Public Works,
341 U.S. 716, 723-24 (1951).
8 342 U.S. at 492-93; 341 U.S. at 719-20.
9 44 Cal.2d at 824, 285 P.2d at 621.
10 341 U.S. at 719-20.
11342 U.S. at 492-93.
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The United States Supreme Court, in holding that the mere claim of
privilege under the Fifth Amendment does not provide a reasonable basis
for the state to terminate an employee's employment, declared that to state
that a person does not have a constitutional right to government employment is only to say that he must comply with reasonable, lawful, and nondiscriminatory terms laid down by the proper authority."
The opinion then went on to reiterate the United States Supreme Court's
position in the Garner13 and Adler 14 cases to the effect that the city had
power to discharge employees who refused to file an affidavit disclosing
certain information to the proper authorities as to fitness for public employment.
"But," said the court, "in each of these cases it was emphasized that
the state must conform to the requisites of due process." 5
The court further states that Wieman v. Updegraf'6 rests squarely on
the proposition that constitutional protection does extend to the public
servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory.' 7 In the Wieman case the United States Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a state statute which required state employees to take an
oath, as a condition of employment, regarding, inter alia, their membership
in or affiliation with certain proscribed organizations.
The decision in the Slochower case then expounds minutely on the history, purpose, and meaning of the privilege against self-incrimination, and
declares that the practice of imputing a sinister meaning to the exercise
of a person's constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment must be
condemned.' 8
The opinion also states that since no inference of guilt was possible
from the claim before the federal committee, the discharge falls of its own
weight as wholly without support:
"There has not been the protection of the individual from arbitrary
action which Mr. Justice Cardozo 19 characterized as the very essence of
due process."2
At first glance one might be prone to say that the fact situations in the
two cases are different, and that therefore the decisions are reconcilable.
The basis of this conclusion would be the fact that in the Steinmetz case,
Dr. Steinmetz failed to invoke his constitutional privilege against self12 350 U.S. at 453.
13 Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
34 Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
3. 350 U.S. at 454.
16344 U.S. 183 (1952).
17 id. at 192.

18 350 U.S. at 454.
19
The court here was citing Cardozo, J. and Ohio Bell Tele. Co. v. Public Utilities Com.,
301 U.S. 292 (1937).
20 350 U.S. at 455.
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incrimination, whereas in the Slockower case, the invocation of the privilege
by Professor Slochower was the very issue involved.
This, of course, is factually true, but in the last analysis it is of little
consequence, because the California statute calls for dismissal if the enumerated questions are not answered because of refusal on any ground. It
appears from the California Supreme Court's language that even if Dr.
Steinmetz had invoked the privilege he could have been discharged, for the
court specifically says that:
"A person may properly be required to disclose information relevant to
fitness and loyalty as a reasonable condition for obtaining or retaining public employment, even though the disclosure, under certain circumstances,
may amount to self-incrimination." 21
This being dicta, it does not embody the resolution or determination
of the court and in no way binds the court. Also, the procedure in reference
to constitutional law prevents the court from considering a constitutional
question that is not raised at the earliest possible moment9 and also prevents the court from passing on the constitutionality of legislation in a
friendly non-adversary proceeding and from anticipating a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity for deciding it.3 This prevented
the California Supreme Court from actually determining the legal effect
of a state employee invoking the privilege against self-incrimination, because Dr. Steinmetz did not in fact invoke the privilege.
This writer, not being restrained by these limitations, can question the
constitutionality of the California statute from any possible avenue of
attack. Indulging in this allowed speculation, it seems that the California
Supreme Court's comment that a public employee may be properly required
to disclose information relevant to fitness for public employment even
though it may amount to self-incrimination, implies that even if Dr. Steinmetz had claimed the privilege against self-incrimination, he could have
been dismissed, and although there was no evidence of wrong doing on his
part, a sinister meaning would have been imputed from the exercise of his
constitutional right. Such inference being expressly held a denial of due
process in the Slochower case, it would seem that section 1028.1 of the
California Government Code would be unconstitutional in this type of fact
situation. Because of this, the writer does not hesitate to state that if the
question of the invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination in a
case involving section 1028.1 was properly presented before the California
Supreme Court, the court would have no alternative, in the light of the
Slochower case, but to hold the statute unconstitutional.
The foregoing would seem to indicate that the Steinmetz and Slochower
cases are reconcilable, but the writer is far from ready to concede this and
2144 Cal.2d at 824, 285 P.2d at 621.
22
Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935) ; Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
2 Ashwander v. T.VA., 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
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would like to carry his speculation one step further and propose that even
under its present facts, the Steinmetz case works a denial of due process
of law as set out in the Slochower case.
Dr. Steinmetz was discharged because he was found to have refused to
answer two questions put to him pursuant to section 1028.1 of the California Government Code. In other words, Dr. Steinmetz chose to remain silent
when certain questions were asked him. It has been held that the right to
free speech includes the right to remain silent.' It would seem that under
the California statute if a person refused to answer at all, he must be discharged from his position. But if he is discharged, isn't an inference of
guilt or wrongdoing being drawn from his exercise of a constitutional right
resulting in a denial of due process of law because there has not been the
protection of the individual from arbitrary action by the state as the United
States Supreme Court in the Slochower case says is necessary? Again it
would seem that the California statute should have been declared unconstitutional.
It might be said that while it is true that a person may not be forced
to incriminate himself or expound his political beliefs, when it comes to
public employment he must choose between the exercise of a constitutional
right and public employment, as he has no "right" as such to public employment. That a person has no "right" to public employment is true as the
United States Supreme Court pointed out in the Wieman case, but the court
also pointed out in that case that although a state has broad powers in the
selection and discharge of its employees, and public employment is a privilege and not a right, even a privilege cannot be denied arbitrarily.
The basic question, it seems, is: What is arbitrary action by the state
constituting a denial of due process of law? A long line of United States
Supreme Court decisions has resulted in what could be said to be a formula
for the determination of the answer to this question.
Generally, the first inquiry is whether the end sought to be accomplished is valid under the state or federal power involved.' In the Steinmetz
case the end sought was to protect the state from the harmful consequences
of Communist infiltration into state agencies and bodies. Hence, the end
was a legitimate one, as from time immemorial a sovereign has had an inherent right to protect itself. 6
The next step is, that assuming a valid end, are the means sought to
accomplish this end reasonable and appropriate? In determining the reasonable of the means, such factors as the conditions existing prior to the legislation, the effectiveness of the statute to improve the conditions, and the
deprivation of individual rights resulting from the legislation must be taken
into consideration.' This last factor requires a balancing of individual
24 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).

22 6 Nebbia v. State of N.Y., 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).

27

Leggett Co. v. Boldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928) ; Burns Baking Co. v. Bryon, 264 U.S. 504

(1924); Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630 (1914).
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rights against the public benefits to be derived from the legislation. 8 It is
at this point that a great difference of opinion has arisen. At one extreme
we have those who would sacrifice individual rights as to life, liberty, and
protection of property guaranteed by the United States Constitution so
long as the safety of the State is preserved; while at the other extreme we
have those who would let the State be damned so long as the individual is
allowed to exercise his constitutional rights without restraint. It has been
the United States Supreme Court's task to try to find the happy and just
medium.
From the decision in the Slockower case holding the statute in question
to be unconstitutional, it appears that the United States Supreme Court
would hold the means adopted by the California Legislature to be unreasonable on the grounds that the deprivation of the individual's rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution is far greater than any public benefit
to be derived from the legislation. The inference of guilt or wrong-doing
which results from the exercise of a constitutional right is too great a price
to pay for the alleged protection the California statute affords, especially
in the light of the non-sensitive nature of the employment that the statute
covers.' If the employment involved was of a highly sensitive nature, involved security or defense, it may be that the pendulum would swing in
favor of submerging individual rights in favor of the public benefit to be
derived, namely, the safety of the State.
Apply the same formula to the Slochower case: It appears that the end
sought was a valid one also, to-wit: the protection of the state from those
unfit to hold public employment. But here also the means to accomplish
the end do not pass the test of reasonableness, as the legislation in question
specifically calls for dismissal on the exercise of a constitutional right,
namely, the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination. This is so
in light of the fact that the court held that the sinister meaning which the
statute infers from the exercise of a constitutional right is far outweighed
by the benefit to be derived by the public, so that the legislation must be
held invalid as being a denial of due process of law.
It seems that the United States Supreme Court is aware of the fact that
the country was founded on individual liberty and that it cannot be saved
in the long run by submerging individual rights in the quest for absolute
safety for the State. 0
As for Dr. Steinmetz, he is in the unfortunate position of an individual
who has had his constitutional rights infringed, but who has no recourse
for redress. The United States Supreme Court in choosing the Slochower
case to decide the issue presented by both cases, has left Steinmetz without
a means to right the "wrong" committed against him in the light of the fact
that he was discharged under a statute that ultimately must be declared
unconstitutional.
28 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) ; Weaner v. Palmer Bros. Co.,
270 U.S.
402 (1926).
20
Peters v. Hobby, 349 U. 331 (1956).
30 Gmswon, Th FIF=h AvENmi
TODAY (195).

